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 1 
Digital Copyright and Human Rights: - A Balancing of Competing 
Obligations, or Is There No Conflict?* 
 
 
Copyright protection on the Internet has become an inherently political and contested 
subject. With increased access to Internet, has come a dramatic, and indeed exponential 
increase in both the desire to create, as well as access information. However, in the sharing 
of information, it is also possible that Internet users may infringe copyright. Actions seeking 
to restrict, prevent or seek redress for copyright infringement may in turn have implications 
for other rights, such as privacy or freedom of expression. This is a fact that has been 
recognised by international bodies; stating that ‘there are apparent conflicts between the 
intellectual property rights regime […] and international human rights law’,1 the UN Sub-
Commission on Human Rights indicated that these conflicts were likely to exacerbate 
informational, social and economic inequalities at the international level. Yet whether there 
is a conflict between copyright and other fundamental rights, or indeed whether copyright 
protection should be afforded human right status are subjects of debate. One key distinction 
is that between the EU, and its focus on human and fundamental rights, and the US, in which 
fundamental rights are not recognised as such, but may instead be considered as rights 
originating in the US Constitution. On this basis, this paper seeks to answer the question 
‘what tensions exist between copyright protection on the Internet and other categories 
of human right?’ The chapter explores this further by providing an overview of what 
copyright protects, arguments concerning its human rights status at international, regional 
and national levels, as well as whether copyright protection is perceived to conflict with 
other rights. As this chapter will demonstrate, whereas the EU recognises copyright 
protection as a human or fundamental right, drawing from international conventions on 
human rights protection, the US does not afford those international conventions the same 
legal weight; furthermore, due to historical differences, the notion of ‘human rights’ is not as 
present in US-based legal discourse. References are instead to Constitutional rights. In the 
EU, European Court of Justice (CJEU) jurisprudence has concluded that copyright as a 
fundamental right can come into conflict with other competing fundamental rights 
obligations such as the right to privacy, or freedom of expression. For this reason, a balance 
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1 Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, 
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must be struck. In comparison, jurisprudence in the US considers that copyright facilitates 
expression, as was the Constitutional intent, therefore meaning that consideration of limits 
on freedom of speech resulting from copyright protection are not subject to Constitutional 
analysis, as there is no perceived conflict. Regardless of these jurisprudential differences, 
however, citizens in the EU and US both see strong copyright protection on the Internet as 
having significant implications for both privacy and freedom of expression; rather than 
copyright and human rights as being a field of ‘no conflict’, it instead represents an uneasy 
tension in which a balance must continually be (re)struck. 
 
COPYRIGHT AS A HUMAN RIGHT: - FROM GLOBAL PRINCIPLES TO EU JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Copyright, briefly, concerns the protection of creative works, defined as ‘literary and artistic 
works […including] every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain’ under the 
Berne Convention,2 the international agreement serving as the basis for the international 
protection of copyright under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (the TRIPS Agreement, hereafter TRIPS). Concluded in 1994 and entering into 
force in 1995, Article 9 of TRIPS requires that all States party to the World Trade 
Organization shall incorporate Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention into their national 
laws.3 Copyright protection therefore extends to all forms of creative content made available 
in digital forms on the Internet, whether sound recordings in the form of MP3s, audiovisual 
works encoded as AVI or Flash files, eBooks, or computer programmes. Copyright grants the 
right-holder exclusive rights over acts such as the reproduction of a work, or its 
communication or distribution to the public,4 meaning that by performing these acts without 
the authorisation of the right-holder, an end-user of a computer system may infringe 
copyright.  
 
One may be forgiven, then, for thinking that copyright is solely a creature of private law 
relationships, and commercial activity. The TRIPS Agreement can be considered an 
economic treaty, concerned with intellectual property insofar as it relates to the protection 
                                                        
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Article 2(1) 
3 With the exception of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which pertains to the protection of an author’s 
moral rights. 
4 Incorporated into EU law under Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
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of property in the context of international trade, and as such, no reference to intellectual 
property and human rights is made. Indeed, studies of intellectual property law, particularly 
those associated with the law and economics movement, appear to reinforce such a 
perception.5 Furthermore, those authors seeking to provide greater justification for 
intellectual property protection, whether using  ‘rights-based’ discourse6 or appeals to 
maximising the utility of creative works,7 or instead critiquing the assumptions upon which 
such justifications are traditionally based,8 tend toward the grounding of arguments in 
economic analysis.9 However, another way of reconceptualising the protection of copyright, 
and indeed the tensions that such protection creates, can be in terms of human rights. Such 
an approach to intellectual property protection is not new, and has in recent years generated 
considerable academic interest.10 The consideration of the right to protection of copyright 
can be traced back to the genesis of human rights as universal principles. Article 27(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that everyone is free to participate in 
the cultural and scientific life of the community, with Article 27(2) declaring that 
furthermore, everyone ‘has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. In 
other words, copyright protection is regarded as a category of right recognised as 
representing the ‘inherent dignity [and] the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family’.11 While the consideration of intellectual property rights was subject to 
                                                        
5 See in particular Richard A Posner, ‘Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach’ (2005) 19 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 57; see also Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli M Salzberger, The Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The Limits of Analysis (Routledge 2013); Michele Boldrin and David K 
Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Cambridge University Press 2008) for alternative economic views on 
copyright law. 
6 Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011). 
7 As discussed in Anne Barron, ‘Copyright Infringement, “free-Riding” and the Lifeworld’ in Lionel Bently, 
Jennifer Davis and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), Copyright and Piracy: An interdisciplinary critique (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). 
8 Such as the response to the above cited work by Barron in Jonathan Aldred, ‘Copyright and the Limits of Law-
and-Economics Analysis’ in Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), Copyright and Piracy: An 
interdisciplinary critique (Cambridge University Press 2010); see also William F Patry, How to Fix Copyright 
(Oxford University Press 2011). 
9 Such as RM Hilty and others, ‘Comment by the Max-Planck Institute on the Commission’s Proposal for a 
Directive to Amend Directive 2006/116 Concerning the Term of Protection for Copyright and Related Rights’ 
(2009) 31(2) European Intellectual Property Review 59 on whether the term of protection for sound 
recordings should have been extended to 70 years post-publication in the EU. 
10 See for example the works of Laurence R Helfer and Graeme W Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Mapping the Global Interface (Cambridge University Press 2011); and Duncan Matthews, Intellectual 
Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
2012); as well as the edited volumes edited by Paul LC Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: 
Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2008); and Christophe Geiger, 
Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2016). 
11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), preamble paragraph 1 
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considerable debate and contestation during the drafting of the Universal Declaration,12 it 
was nevertheless incorporated into the final text ‘by those who felt the ongoing 
internationalization of copyright needed a boost and that this could be a tool in this 
respect’.13 
 
As readers will no doubt be aware, however, the Universal Declaration is not directly legally 
binding,14 instead serving as the basis for future international law making. Other covenants 
are legally binding, however, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, or ICESCR.15 The ICESCR mirrors the language of the Universal Declaration, 
stating at Article 15(1)(c) that states recognise the right of everyone to ‘benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author’.  Most of the world is now party to the ICESCR, 
with the notable exception of the United States, which, while signing the Covenant, did not 
ratify, with the views of US administrations ranging from perceiving the concept of the rights 
reflected in the ICESCR as being ‘socialist’ during the height of the Cold War,16 to being 
‘socially desirable goals’ to strive towards rather than binding rights,17 to most recently the 
Obama administration stating the importance of human rights, but not committing to 
ratification of the ICESCR.18 With regard to the treatment of intellectual property generally, 
and indeed copyright specifically, the US legal regime provides for no specific protection of 
these rights as any kind of human right, instead affording Constitutional protection under 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, empowering Congress to ‘promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries’. In this, it may be seen that the protection 
afforded to copyright in the US is on the basis of a consequentionalist line of reasoning, in 
                                                        
12 Paul LC Torremans, ‘Copyright as a Human Right’ in Paul LC Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human Rights: 
Freedom Of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy (Kluwer Law International 2004) 5–6; see also Helfer and 
Austin (n 11) 176–180. 
13 Torremans (n 13) 6. 
14 Mihály Ficsor, ‘Collective Management and Multi-Territorial Licensing: Key Issues of the Transposition of 
Directive 2014/26/EU’ in Irini A Stamatoudi (ed), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2016) 220. 
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
16 See for example Helen M Stacy, Human Rights for the 21st Century: Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture (Stanford 
University Press 2009). 
17 Patrick J Austin, ‘Expansive Rights: FDR’s Proposed “Economic” Bill of Rights Memorialized in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, But with Little Impact in the United States’ 
(2015) XV Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 23. 
18 Judith Blau, ‘Human Rights: What the United States Might Learn from the Rest of the World And, Yes, from 
American Sociology’ (2016) doi:10.1111/socf.12299 Sociological Forum 1, 2. 
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which it is for the benefits that the dissemination of works accrues that it is protected, rather 
than on specific human rights grounds.19 According to Blau, human rights-based discourses 
do not feature prominently in US politics, with US citizens neither clear nor convinced of the 
relevance of such approaches to legal protection, particularly in comparison to the EU, 
where such understandings have been mainstreamed.20 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
the majority of discussion of copyright in human rights terms, and indeed law-making along 
such lines, has taken place in Europe. For this reason, the analysis that will be conducted of 
the balancing of human rights obligations impacted by copyright will focus upon actions and 
jurisprudence at the EU level. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the international treaty to which all 
Council of Europe member states are party, also appears to provide for intellectual property 
protection as a human right. For clarity, it is worth reiterating that the Council of Europe, the 
ECHR and the ECtHR are not institutions of EU law, but intergovernmental agreement 
outwith the EU legal framework. Under Article 1 of Protocol 1, ‘every natural or legal person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’. Whether this applied to ‘intellectual’ 
property as well as physical property was uncertain, with the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and European Commission on Human Rights avoiding consideration of 
intellectual property-related issues.21 However, the ECtHR has concluded that the protection 
of intellectual property rights, be they copyright, patent or trade mark, ‘incontestably enjoys 
the protection of Article 1 of Protocol 1’.22 This decision was confirmed in Anheuser-Busch v 
Portugal in 2007, in which the Grand Chamber stated that it agreed ‘with the [trial] 
Chamber’s conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property as 
such’.23 For some time, it had appeared that the EU would become a party to the ECHR. The 
EU was expected to join the ECHR after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, as 
written in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, in Opinion 2/1324 of 
the European Court of Justice, sitting as a full court, it was determined that the agreement 
                                                        
19 Helfer and Austin (n 11) 174–175. 
20 Blau (n 19) 7. 
21 Laurence R Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 3. 
22 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, [2005] ECHR 686 (11 October 2005),   
23 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, [2007] ECHR 40 (11 January 2007), para.72 of the judgement  
24 Opinion 2/13 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 EU:C:2014:2454 
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formulated to achieve this accession was not compatible with EU law, particularly regarding 
the autonomy of EU law, a decision considered ‘regrettable’ by Storgaard.25  
 
Despite this, however, the EU has nevertheless constituted the ECHR as part of its 
constitutional order through using it in the construction of its own approach to fundamental 
rights as constituting general principles of EU law.26  Arguments that it should appear based 
on a belief that ‘a human right to one’s creative productions arguably casts new emphasis on 
the role and vulnerabilities of individual creators’.27 Geiger, for example, argues that the 
consideration of copyright protection in human rights (or fundamental rights) terms is to be 
welcomed, and can serve as the basis for a constitutionalisation of intellectual property 
law.28 Furthermore, it has provided for its own recognition of intellectual property 
protection as a ‘fundamental right’ under the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights29. Under 
Article 17’s ‘right to property’, which states at Article 17(1) that everyone ‘has the right to 
own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions’, Article 17(2) 
rather perfunctorily states that ‘intellectual property shall be protected’. This protection, it 
must be noted, is based upon Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, with intellectual property 
being mentioned specifically and separately due to its ‘growing importance and Community 
secondary legislation’.30 In comparison to the US, then, the EU appears to be clear in its 
understanding that copyright, as well as an economic right, can also constitute a human 
right. 
 
STRIKING A FAIR BALANCE: - THE DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
                                                        
25 LH Storgaard, ‘EU Law Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection - On Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 485, 499. 
26 Tuomas Mylly, ‘The Constitutionalization of the European Legal Order’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 105. 
27 Helfer and Austin (n 11) 180. 
28 See generally Christophe Geiger, ‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?  The Influence of 
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union’ (2006) 37 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 371; see also Megan M Carpenter, ‘Intellectual Property: A Human 
(Not Corporate) Right’ in David Keane and Yvonne McDermott (eds), The Challenge of Human Rights: Past, 
Present and Future (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2012); for a critique of this reasoning, Jonathan Griffiths and 
Luke McDonagh, ‘Fundamental Rights and European IP Law - the Case of Art 17(2) of the EU’ in Christophe 
Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property: Achievements and New Perspectives (Edward Elgar 
2013). 
29 Charter on the Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391 
30 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17, 303/23 
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Perhaps at the forefront of discussions on copyright and human rights on the Internet has 
been the issues of privacy31 and freedom of expression,32 particularly as it pertains to 
copyright enforcement, as well as the right to expression. At the outset, it must be made 
clear that the TRIPS Agreement makes no reference to the balancing of the protection of 
copyright with other human rights obligations. In the EU, the Information Society 
Directive,33 the main Directive concerning copyright protection on the Internet, does not 
deal with privacy or expression directly as concepts in conflict with copyright protection. 
Instead, it makes brief references to the notion, stating in its non-legally binding recital 3 
that copyright protection will help facilitate freedom of expression, and at recital 57 that the 
use of Technological Prevention Measures used to protect copyright, such as rights-
management information systems that gather data on users of digital works, should 
incorporate privacy safeguards as provided for in the Data Protection Directive34. 
Furthermore, under Article 9, where it was stated that the Directive does not prejudice 
earlier legal provisions, including those pertaining to data protection and privacy. The 
Enforcement Directive35, passed in 2004 and intended to facilitate effective protection of 
intellectual property rights through ensuring access to information regarding individuals 
alleged to be engaging in infringement36, refers in recital 2 to the fact that the measures 
contained ‘should not hamper […] the protection of personal data, including on the Internet’, 
but not to privacy as a fundamental right. What it does reference, interestingly, is the 
fundamental rights dimension of intellectual property protection, by stating that ‘the 
Directive respects the fundamental rights […] recognised by the Charter […] in particular, [it] 
seeks to ensure full respect for intellectual property, in accordance with Article 17(2) of that 
Charter’.37 
 
                                                        
31 Recognised as a fundamental right under Article 8 of the ECHR, and under Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, with Article 8 providing protection for personal data. 
32 Article 10 of the ECHR, and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
33 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society 
34 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, which is due to be replaced in 2018 by the new Regulation 2016/679 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, which was adopted in April 2016. 
35 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
36 Ibid, Article 8 
37 Ibid, recital 32 
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The requirement to achieve a balance between competing rights was first established in the 
case of Promusicae.38 This case concerned the right to information under Article 8 of the 
Enforcement Directive, and whether an Internet Service Provider (ISP) was obliged to 
provide personal information regarding an alleged copyright infringer. According to 
Promusicae, a trade organisation representing the recorded music industry in Spain, ISPs 
had a legal requirement under the Enforcement Directive to provide information such as the 
name and address of users of the KaZaA peer-to-peer software alleged to be infringing 
copyright through sharing copies of copyrighted music. Telefónica, the ISP, instead claimed 
that it was only authorised by Spanish law to provide this information to facilitate 
investigations into criminal conduct in order to safeguard public security, not either in or 
proceeding civil investigations. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU concluded that while 
Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive does require Member States to ensure that national 
judicial authorities may be able to order that information concerning infringement be 
provided, it did not necessarily follow that, in order to ensure effective protection of 
copyright, this imposed ‘an obligation to communicate personal data in the context of civil 
proceedings’.39 Furthermore, the CJEU considered this case in light of fundamental rights, 
considering that Member States must ‘take care to rely on an interpretation of the directives 
which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected 
by the Community legal order’.40 In this case, this required a balancing of the fundamental 
right to respect of intellectual property, and the protection of personal data ‘and hence of 
private life’.41  
 
Promusicae was then followed by several judgements concerned with copyright protection 
on the Internet, each of which reiterated this principle and the need for ensuring the striking 
of a ‘fair balance’ between these fundamental rights. In two closely linked cases, Scarlet v 
SABAM42 and SABAM v Netlog43, the CJEU was asked to determine whether requests by 
SABAM, a collective rights management organisation in Belgium, to require Scarlet, an ISP, to 
end copyright infringement by users of its service. SABAM proposed a system in which 
                                                        
38 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU EU:C:2008:54 
39 Ibid, para.58 
40 Ibid, para.68 
41 Ibid, para.63 
42 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
EU:C:2011:771 
43 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog NV EU:C:2012:85 
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Scarlet would make it impossible for its customers to send or receive copyright infringing 
files by way of peer-to-peer file-sharing software, on the basis that it considered the ISP ‘best 
placed […] to take measures to bring to an end copyright infringements committed by its 
customers’.44 The CJEU concluded that in order to prevent infringing activities from taking 
place in the way SABAM requested, a preventative monitoring system would need to be 
created that would identify files related to peer-to-peer traffic, and indeed whether those 
files contained content protected by copyright, in order to block that infringing activity. Such 
a system was declared incompatible with Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive,45 which 
states that Member States shall not impose an obligation upon ISPs to actively monitor the 
information that they transmit or store.46  Furthermore, the CJEU considered that such a 
system would raise serious privacy concerns, as it would necessitate analysing all 
information to be transmitted and all customers using that network.47 While acknowledging 
that copyright protection constitutes a fundamental right under Article 17(2) of the Charter, 
the CJEU argued that there was nothing in that provision to indicate that the ‘right is 
inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected’.48 Therefore, following 
Promusicae, it was necessary to ensure that a fair balance was struck between the protection 
of copyright as a fundamental right, and the right to protection of personal data and private 
life under Article 8 of the Charter, as well as the freedom to receive and impart information 
under Article 11.49 In the proposed system, this balance would not be struck.50 The 
reasoning in Netlog was much briefer, but followed directly from Scarlet.  Netlog was not an 
ISP, but a social media platform, similar in function to Facebook. In this case, SABAM 
requested the same filtering system be activated, but in this instance by the owners of the 
Netlog platform, rather than the ISP.  The CJEU reiterated its decision from Scarlet, stating 
the need for a balance to be struck, and that such a preventative monitoring system would 
be incompatible to the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Charter, as well as the freedom 
to receive or impart information under Article 11.51 
 
                                                        
44 Scarlet (n42), para.18 
45 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market 
46 Scarlet (n42), para.40 
47 Ibid, para.39 
48 Ibid, para.43 
49 Ibid, para.50 
50 Ibid, para.53 
51 Netlog (n43) para.48 
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The interpretation of the effect of these decisions has been considerably broad.  While 
Hugenholtz states that these decisions make it clear that copyright protection must be 
balanced with other fundamental rights such as privacy and freedom of expression,52 the 
extent to which this may be considered an explicit recognition of, and indeed desire to 
protect, fundamental rights is disputed; whereas citizens’ rights organisations such as EDRi 
(European Digital Rights) considered these decisions to constitute a ‘vital victory for 
Internet freedoms’,53 not all academics have been so convinced of an express human rights 
rationale. Griffiths, for example, argues that the human rights arguments raised in cases such 
as Scarlet and Netlog did not reflect a desire by the Court to expressly balance competing 
human rights obligations, but instead reinforce a decision already made on the basis of 
specific Directives, albeit in a way that expanded the Court’s competence.54 Regardless of 
underlying motive, however, it is clear that in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the 
understanding is that copyright and other fundamental freedoms may be in conflict, 
requiring a balancing of those competing obligations. This has been further reflected in cases 
such as GS Media,55 where it was concluded that hyperlinking to content online would only 
constitute copyright infringement where it was communicated to a ‘new’ public by means of 
circumventing password protection or other TPMs,56 and if the alleged infringer was likely 
to have knowledge that their act constituted an infringement.57 On the issue of fundamental 
rights, the Court stated that:  
 
[It] should be noted that the internet is in fact of particular importance to freedom of 
expression and of information, safeguarded by Article 11 of the Charter, and that 
hyperlinks contribute to its sound operation as well as to the exchange of opinions 
and information in that network characterised by the availability of immense 
amounts of information.58 
 
                                                        
52 P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Flexible Copyright: Can EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair Use?’ in Irini A 
Stamatoudi (ed), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Kluwer Law International 2016) 
432. 
53 EDRI, ‘Scarlet v SABAM: A Win for Fundamental Rights and Internet Freedoms’ (EDRI, 30 November 2011) 
<http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.23/scarlet-sabam-win-fundamental-rights> accessed 7 August 
2013. 
54 Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or Harmonizing? The Court of Justice, the Right to Property and 
European Copyright Law’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 65. 
55 Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands and Others EU:C:2016:644 
56 Following Case C-466/12 Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB EU:C:2014:76 
57 GS Media (n55) paras.48-49 
58 ibid, para.45 
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Similarly in the case of UPC Telekabel59, which considered whether IP blocking regimes that 
prevented users from accessing websites making available copyright infringing materials 
were contrary to principles of fundamental rights, that the protection of copyright as a 
fundamental right had to be balanced with the protection of fundamental rights such as 
those to conduct a business or access information.60  Noting that there was ‘nothing 
whatsoever in the wording of Article 17(2) of the Charter to suggest that the right to 
intellectual property is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected’,61 the 
CJEU nevertheless concluded that blocking orders would nevertheless be viewed as 
proportionate where they are specifically targeted and ‘do not unnecessarily deprive 
internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available’.62 The CJEU 
has therefore developed a line of case law that is explicit on two points: - 1) that copyright 
protection constitutes a fundamental right, deserving of protection under the EU Charter, 
and 2) that its protection may potentially come into conflict with other fundamental rights, 
requiring a balancing of those competing obligations. That this conflict between copyright 
protection and other fundamental rights exists, and is a conflict that requires balancing, is 
something that has been recognised and adopted by other EU institutions such as the 
European Commission.  For example, in the December 2015 Communication on ‘Towards a 
modern, more European copyright framework’,63 the Commission stated that while 
copyright requires civil enforcement mechanisms, they should ‘take full account of 
fundamental rights’.64 Whether the proposed reforms to enforcement achieve this, however, 
is something that is not yet known, as at the time of writing the Commission’s approach to 
this issue has not yet been published.  
 
COPYRIGHT AS THE ENGINE OF EXPRESSION: - FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Unlike the thrust of the case law in the EU, disputes concerning the balancing of copyright 
protection with other rights are not framed in human rights terms in the US. While the 
jurisprudence at times deals with similar issues, they are framed by constitutional rather 
                                                        
59 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH EU:C:2014:192 
60 Ibid, para.46 
61 Ibid, para.61 
62 Ibid, para.63 
63 European Commission, ‘Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework’ (2015) COM(2015) 626. 
64 ibid 11. 
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than fundamental rights discourses. As stated above, copyright protection is afforded 
constitutional protection in the US, on the basis of a consequentionalist reasoning that 
dictates protection is granted in order to facilitate socially beneficial progress in the arts and 
sciences. In comparison to the EU, there is no specifically stated constitutional status 
afforded to the right of privacy in the US, and privacy ultimately receives little legal 
protection.65 Indeed, while the Supreme Court in the case of Griswold v 
Connecticut66declared that there is an implied constitutional protection of privacy by way of 
the First Amendment67, which ‘has a penumbra where privacy is protected from 
governmental intrusion’.68 This right of privacy has been applied in cases such as Roe v 
Wade69, regarding a woman’s right to a termination of pregnancy. However, as Strahilevitz 
argues, this protection is limited in its efficacy, ‘largely because judges have chosen to 
interpret the First Amendment in a way that places privacy and speech interests at 
loggerheads’.70 Furthermore, according to Shiffrin, protections for privacy in the US are 
rooted in protecting the liberty of individuals against government tyranny, ‘rather than 
against violations of dignity by the media or the market’.71 Indeed, as the First Amendment 
states, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’. The target of 
this principle is lawmakers, rather than individuals or organisations, raising questions as to 
whether individuals can rely upon the First Amendment in horizontal disputes with other 
individuals. In the context of copyright law, this perception of two rights at ‘loggerheads’, 
namely privacy and freedom of expression, appears credible.  
 
In fact, given the comparatively meagre privacy protection given to those in the public eye in 
the US, including politicians and celebrities,72 it is perhaps no surprise that the use of 
copyright as a means of protecting privacy rights otherwise given short thrift by the courts 
has been attempted. Some of the earlier cases considering the interaction between copyright 
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and freedom of speech under the First Amendment were in fact cases in which the dispute 
was over rights to privacy in conflict with free speech, in which copyright protection was not 
at the centre of the conflict, but the means by which other rights were being protected.73 For 
example, in the Random House case74, the Second Circuit of the Court of Appeal was asked to 
intervene in a dispute between Howard Hughes, an entrepreneur known for his eccentric 
and reclusive lifestyle, and John Keats, writer of an unauthorised biography. Seeking to 
protect his privacy and prevent certain details of his life becoming public, Hughes had 
purchased the copyright over a series of articles called ‘The Howard Hughes Story’, upon 
which John Keats had drawn considerably in writing his biography. Placing freedom of 
speech above privacy, the Court concluded that the use of the material from the biographies 
was fair use,75 a ‘privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use copyrighted 
material in a reasonable manner without his consent’76, and that on occasion the interest of a 
copyright holder may be subordinated to ‘the greater public interest in the development of 
art, science and industry’.77 Given the comparatively little judicial weight given to privacy in 
the US, more attention has been given to the interaction between copyright and First 
Amendment rights to speech. 
 
In comparison to the EU, where the interaction between the protection of copyright and 
freedom of expression is seen as one of balancing between separate and distinct rights, in 
the US, ‘contemporary jurisprudence is not one that balances free speech considerations 
against other interests […and] does not weight the free speech rights of one party against the 
copyright rights of the other party’.78 Instead, if copyright is perceived as interfering with 
free speech, it is to be analysed internally, determining whether copyright itself is compliant 
with the First Amendment. In Harper & Row79, the US Supreme Court considered the 
interaction between copyright and the First Amendment, determining that not only was 
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76 Ibid para.13 
77 Ibid 
78 Michael D Birnhack, ‘Copyright Speech: A Transatlantic View’ in Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human 
Rights: Freedom Of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy (Kluwer Law International 2004) 41–42. 
79 Harper & Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 (1985) 
 14 
copyright First Amendment compatible, but that it acted to serve the interests of the First 
Amendment. Referring to the drafting of the Constitution, the Supreme Court argued that the 
‘framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas’.80 In other words, the Supreme Court has held that there is no 
need to scrutinise copyright’s compatibility with the First Amendment, as both ultimately 
serve the same goal, namely that of facilitating speech.81 The Supreme Court reiterated this 
in the case of Eldred v Ashcroft,82 a case concerned with the duration of copyright, and an 
appeal against the term of protection being extended to the life of the author plus seventy 
years. In this case, the Supreme Court referred to Harper & Row, stating that ‘copyright law 
contains built-in First Amendment protections’,83 referring once again to the fair use 
doctrine. While over-protection of copyright may potentially conflict with free speech, the 
internal conflict is mediated through reliance upon fair use in a court when accused of an act 
of infringement.84 In Golan v Holder85, this was again affirmed, finding that there was no 
conflict.86 A number of scholars have supported this position, such as Eisgruber, who has 
argued that ‘copyright is not censorious [and it] does not pick and choose among ideas and 
subject-matters’,87 and Nimmer, who argued that while the First Amendment serves to 
protect speech, copyright then works to disseminate it; any potential hindrance to freedom 
of speech is ‘far out-balanced by the public benefit that accrues through copyright 
encouragement of creativity’.88 Such a perception, it is submitted, is based on the view that 
rather than having the potential to censor, copyright instead serves as a tool for the 
exchange of ideas.89 
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Yet such an approach is too focused upon the role of the state as censor, which is 
understandable given the nature of the First Amendment as a check on governmental 
power.90 However, on the Internet, media and market power complement, and in some 
respects, supplant the power of the state.91 Timothy Garton Ash refers to the Internet’s 
private superpowers, companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Intel, Oracle, Cisco and 
Wikipedia.92 Yet it is not only these Internet intermediary service providers that wield 
considerable power on the Internet, but traditional copyright industries such as the media, 
record labels and movie studios have also been empowered. Through a process of online 
intermediarisation, the decision whether actions on the Internet are considered to be a fair 
use of a work no longer resides in a judicial assessment, but an administrative exercise 
performed by a private undertaking such as Google or Facebook.93 Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998,94 a service provider shall not be deemed liable 
for copyright infringement for material transferred through the Internet connection or 
stored on a computer system, so long as it removes or restricts access to the infringing 
content upon receiving a request from the copyright holder. Through a system known as 
‘notice and takedown’, should an allegation of infringement be made to a service provider 
such as YouTube, saying that a video contains infringing content, under the DMCA that 
service provider is obliged to remove that infringing content. Where that removed content is 
a direct copy of a work, such as a song from an album uploaded to YouTube without the 
permission of the copyright holder, in principle there would be no First Amendment 
concern; the right to free speech does not include the right to pirate someone else’s work,95 
or as it was put in Eldred v Aschroft, to ‘make other people’s speeches’.96  
 
However, in more complex cases, there is the risk that notice and takedown in the absence of 
judicial assessment may lead to conflicts with free speech, such as where a transformative 
work such as a mash-up, in which two songs are remixed together in a way to create a new, 
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original work, is removed from YouTube,97 or where a video of a dancing baby is removed 
because of the inclusion of the music to which the baby was dancing.98 In the second case, 
the uploader of the video sued Universal Music Group (UMG) for misrepresentation of a 
DMCA claim, arguing that UMG acted in bad faith, as the entity would have been aware that 
such a use would be fair.99 While the District Court found in the uploader’s favour, it was not 
until the appeal heard by the Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeal in 2015,100 eight years 
later, that the court affirmed that the video was fair use.  While reiterating that fair use was a 
defence rather than cause of action, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that ‘duty to 
consider, in good faith and prior to sending a takedown notification, whether allegedly 
infringing material constitutes fair use’.101 It must be stated that the First Amendment was 
not mentioned at any point in the decision of the District Court, nor in the Court of Appeal. It 
would appear that, at least in the eyes of the Court, there is still no (officially recognised) 
conflict. Nevertheless, scholars have argued that the DMCA and the system of notice and 
takedown do have a noticeable ‘chilling effect’,102 as noted by Hon. McKeown, a judge of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. In an address to the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IPR, 
republished as an article, McKeown stated that ‘copyright has become a go-to tool to prevent 
the spread of damaging or offensive information on the Internet’.103 Examples include the 
use claims of copyright infringement to remove Wikileaks disclosure of US diplomatic cables, 
embarrassing internal memos by Citigroup praising austerity as good for business after 
receiving considerable bailouts, and the use of takedown requests to suppress election 
campaign videos on YouTube by rival camps.104 In the absence of effective privacy 
protection, McKeown argues, copyright law becomes a surrogate.105 While copyright may be 
seen as the engine of expression, and fair use its safety valve, in the absence of strong human 
                                                        
97 See generally Andrew S Long, ‘Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing Copyright to 
Promote the First Amendment Values of Transformative Video’ (2007) 60 Oklahoma Law Review 317. 
98 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (Avery Publishing 2008) 2–
3; Samantha Von Hoene, ‘Fair Use in the Classroom; A Conundrum for Digital User-Generated Content in the 
Remix Culture’ (2015) 7 Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal 97. 
99 Lenz v Universal Music Group, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (2007) 
100 Lenz v Universal Music Group, 801 F.3d 1126 (2015) 
101 Ibid, 1138 
102 Kaminski Margot, ‘Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem’ 
(2013) 73 Maryland Law Review 587; see also Wendy Seltzer, ‘Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe 
Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment’ (2010) 24 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 
171. 
103 M Margaret McKeown, ‘Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the FIrst 
Amendment’ (2016) 15 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 1, 11. 
104 Farrand (n 74) 415–419 for more on these examples. 
105 McKeown (n 104) 14–15. 
 17 
rights norms, there remains an uneasy tension in the apparent ‘no conflict’ approach of US 
jurisprudence. 
 
SEEING THINGS DIFFERENTLY: - CITIZEN PARTICIPATING IN LAW-MAKING WHERE 
BALANCE IS NOT FOUND, OR RIGHTS ARE IN CONFLICT 
 
Whether a fine-tuned balance, as perceived by the judges of the CJEU, or an internal conflict 
(or indeed denial of conflict) resolved by recourse to the principle of fair use, as in the US, 
the compatibility of copyright protection with human rights online is increasingly a 
contested political debate.106 With the increase in concern over the existence of ‘digital 
rights’,107 Internet users become activists, forming ‘issue networks’, in which they 
collaborate to raise awareness and challenge what they perceive as threats to these online 
freedoms, in particular where they concern privacy and freedom of speech.108 We have seen 
such protests throughout the EU and the US, albeit taking somewhat different forms, and 
focused upon different fundamental rights issues. Considering these developments 
chronologically (as the two phenomena are linked), it is best to consider the US first. Due to 
the perceived ineffectiveness of the established ‘notice and takedown’ system, two Bills with 
similar subject matter were announced in 2011, one in the House of Representatives, the 
other in the Senate. In the House, a Bill called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)109 was 
introduced by Representative Lamar Smith, and in the Senate, the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA)110 
by Senator Patrick Leahy. Both proposals were considered to be heavily lobbied for by 
copyright industries, including the Recording Industry Association of America, and the 
Motion Picture Association of America.111 SOPA112 contained provisions that would allow for 
immunity from liability of an Internet intermediary service provider for voluntarily blocking 
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foreign websites (i.e. websites with a non-US based IP address)113 believed to be infringing 
IP rights, allowing for the Attorney General to order the blocking of websites believed to be 
infringing IP rights,114 as well as making it illegal to stream infringing copyrighted works.115 
According to Minnock, these provisions raised considerable First Amendment concerns, 
including the right of US citizens to ‘read and listen to foreign speech’.116 According to the 
EFF, while ostensibly intended to target sites allowing for indiscriminate piracy of 
copyrighted works, SOPA’s vaguely defined notion of ‘foreign website’ could include services 
such as Rapidshare and Dropbox, as well as sites discussing piracy such as TorrentFreak, and 
sites featuring user-generated content such as Deviant Art or Sound Cloud, which may 
incorporate elements of a copyrighted work in a way constituting fair use. EFF concluded by 
stating that ‘had these bills been passed five or ten years ago, even YouTube might not exist 
today’.117  
 
Despite judicial understanding that copyright poses no First Amendment conflict, and that 
fair use serves as a suitable safety valve for free speech, such an understanding was not 
shared by US citizens concerned by the SOPA and PIPA legislation. Activists pointed to the 
Department for Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unit 
erroneously shutting down websites for alleged copyright infringements that were not 
sharing infringing materials, such as a hip-hop blog without allowing the owner the 
opportunity to appeal that decision prior to the site being taken offline.118 With increased 
public attention being brought to the SOPA/PIPA proposals, online activists began to 
disseminate information concerning the potential for the legislation to impact upon First 
Amendment rights, framing their arguments as an explicit conflict between copyright 
protection and freedom of speech.119 The event that significantly raised the profile of anti-
SOPA/PIPA activists however was the action taken by Wikipedia in January 2012. After 
discussions between Jimmy Wales, founder of Wikipedia, and Wikipedia collaborators, 
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Wales made the decision to ‘black out’ Wikipedia on 18 January as a form of protest against 
the IP Bills. Making the website inaccessible, except for a message stating that the proposed 
legislation could ‘fatally damage the free and open Internet’, Wales provided information 
regarding SOPA, and how concerned US citizens could contact their political representatives 
regarding SOPA/PIPA, on a page accessed more than 162 million times.120 On this basis, 
more than 8 million people looked up their representatives’ contact information using a 
Wikipedia provided tool.121 This action was mirrored by other leading websites and online 
communities in a form of ‘day of action’, with other sites such as Reddit also becoming 
inaccessible,122 and sites like Google and Flickr featuring protests against SOPA/PIPA.123 As a 
result of this coordinated online and offline action, in which the Internet was used to spread 
information regarding the potential First Amendment concerns of the SOPA/PIPA 
legislation, and offline contacting of representatives in order to protest against the adoption 
of the legislation, plans for the legislation were ultimately shelved. The media attention, with 
newspapers such as the New York Times focusing upon the protests and the concerns of 
activists,124 and the specific framing of SOPA/PIPA as presenting serious First Amendment 
threats facilitated collaborative and engaged political action that made the position of 
Congress untenable.125 While not necessarily resolving the apparent conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment, what the debate over SOPA/PIPA demonstrates is that 
the judicial perception of there being ‘no conflict’ is not one shared by citizens. 
  
In the EU, citizen mobilisation centred on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). 
ACTA was a plurilateral trade agreement negotiated outside of the traditional framework of 
the World Trade Organisation and World Intellectual Property Organisation, which amongst 
other provisions such as allowing for the seizure and destruction of pharmaceuticals in 
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transit that were believed to infringe upon patents,126 also included provisions on the 
protection of copyright on the Internet. Negotiated between the US, Canada, Australia, the 
EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and 
the US,127 leaks of drafts of the Agreement in 2008, then confirmed by the release of 
deliberative drafts by the European Commission in 2010 indicated Article 2.14 provided for 
the imposition of criminal sanctions ‘at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale’, which was intended to include 
wilful copyright and related rights infringements ‘that have no direct or indirect motivation 
of financial gain’. Article 2.18(1) specifically stated that these sanctions should be applied to 
cases of wilful infringement that take place by means of the internet/in the digital 
environment.128 In the final text, ACTA Article 27(1), stated that each Party to the Agreement 
would ‘promote cooperative efforts with the business community to effectively address [...] 
copyright or related rights infringement […] while preserving fundamental principles such 
as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy.’ Unlike the legislation proposed in the 
US, this international agreement did make specific reference to fundamental rights due to 
the involvement of the EU in negotiations. Indeed, academic opinion was that while there 
were legitimate concerns regarding the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiating 
process, the Agreement itself did not propose any significant changes to the existing EU 
regime, nor present threats to fundamental rights beyond those that have already been 
discussed in the context of the Promusicae and Scarlet cases.129 
 
Nevertheless, as with concerns over SOPA/PIPA, although legal opinion may have been that 
there was not necessarily anything in ACTA to upset the existing balance between the 
protection of copyright and other fundamental rights, this understanding was not shared by 
online activists. Drawing considerably upon the resistance to SOPA/PIPA in the US, Polish 
citizens began mobilising activists through Facebook, culminating in a number of anti-ACTA 
protests taking place in early 2012. Facebook pages such as ‘Nie dla ACTA’ were set up, 
which according to a post made on the page on 21 January 2012, had over 10,000 views 
                                                        
126 Of particular concern to countries such as India and Brazil, as discussed in Benjamin Farrand and Helena 
Carrapico, ‘Copyright Law as a Matter of (Inter)national Security? - The Attempt to Securitise Commercial 
Infringement and Its Spillover onto Individual Liability’ (2012) 57 Crime, Law and Social Change 373. 
127 ibid 392. 
128 Farrand (n 107) 181. 
129 See for example Farrand (n 107); C Geiger, ‘Weakening Multilateralism in Intellectual Property Lawmaking: 
A European Perspective on ACTA’ (2012) 3(2) The WIPO Journal 166; cf Emma Leith, ‘ACTA: The Anti-
Counterfeiting Crack-Down’ (2011) 22(3) Entertainment Law Review 81. 
 21 
within the first 24 hours of being active. By 22 January 2012, this number had reached 
100,000 views.130 On the 26 January, thousands of Polish protestors marched through the 
streets of cities such as Warsaw, Krakow and Wroclaw, drawing international press 
attention.131 These protestors framed ACTA not as being an instrument of copyright 
protection, but as a significant threat to the privacy rights and freedom of expression of EU 
citizens. As with the attention-raising activities of Wikipedia against SOPA/PIPA, online 
organisations such as LQDN and Digitale Linke began work facilitating information 
dissemination regarding ACTA and the perceived threat to ‘Internet freedoms’. As a result, a 
coordinated protest took place in February 2012, including tens of thousands of protestors 
in Germany, as well as thousands in Bulgaria, France and other EU Member States.132 LQDN 
in particular provided information on how activists could contact Members of the European 
Parliament (MEP) to voice their concern, including contact details and scripts that could be 
used by those calling their MEP.133 Through this combination of online activism, increased 
media attention, and subsequent offline engagement with the political process, the position 
of the European Parliament on ACTA changed significantly; from being fully in support of it, 
and urging the Commission to take the action necessary to speedily conclude the 
Agreement,134 the European Parliament instead became concerned regarding the 
implications of ACTA for the Internet, and fundamental freedoms. The European Parliament, 
once again affirming the balancing approach of the EU, recommended rejection of ACTA, 
stating that ‘it is crucial to strike the appropriate balance between enforcement of IPRs and 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, the right to privacy and protection of 
personal data’.135 ACTA, it concluded, did not strike such a balance, and as such, had negative 
implications for rights to freedom expression and privacy.136 In June 2012, following 
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unprecedented citizen engagement with the European Parliament, the ratification of ACTA 
by the EU was rejected by 478 votes to 39.137 
 
However, it must be stated that citizen participation in the challenging of intellectual 
property agreements perceived by members of the public as conflicting with other human 
rights, such as access to information and privacy, is largely dependent upon their awareness 
of the existence of such agreements, and being framed in language that allows for 
mobilisation against these legal reforms.138 Both the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreements  appear to be dead with little 
chance of resuscitation. Both agreements had provisions appearing to mandate copyright 
enforcement provisions that would impact fundamental rights in similar ways to SOPA/PIPA 
and ACTA, yet citizen mobilisation against these agreements was not nearly as visible as that 
against SOPA/PIPA in the US, and ACTA in the EU. Indeed, it was the election of current US 
President Trump that led to the negotiation of these agreements being suspended, rather 
than citizen activism, and based on an ostensibly anti-free trade agenda rather than a 
concern over fundamental rights. Where changes to laws are more complex, and less visible, 
public engagement with law reforms are significantly reduced, meaning that the balance 
may be tipped further in the favour of copyright protection, as opposed to other competing 
human rights interests. What follows these failed initiatives, whether in the EU, US, or 
internationally, remains to be seen. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Whereas at the global level, copyright protection is afforded universal human right 
protection, the level of acceptance of this proposition in different legal regimes varies. The 
EU has been unequivocal in its affirmation that it affords copyright protection fundamental 
rights status. It has reiterated this both in binding legislation, as well as in the jurisprudence 
of its highest court. Yet, it recognises that even as a fundamental right, copyright protection 
requires balancing against interests represented in other fundamental rights, such as 
privacy or freedom of expression – copyright is not supreme as a form of right, and the 
extent of its protections limited in order to ensure effective protection of other competing 
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interests. In the US, however, the courts have not reached the same conclusions. The legal 
position is that copyright facilitates rather than hinders speech, and therefore is not subject 
to First Amendment analysis. Any potential restrictions of speech can be managed internally, 
through the fair use doctrine. However, as has been demonstrated, the automation of notice 
and takedown procedures, as well as the ability to use copyright to suppress information in 
such a way that fair use cannot be relied upon, brings the US courts’ jurisprudence into 
question. It is a position that Internet activists may not necessarily agree with – it is 
interesting to note that the unity between the US and EU systems came in the form of citizen 
protests decrying the expansion of IP rights on the Internet, with both groups mobilising 
through coordinated online and offline action to combat these perceived threats. For 
Internet users, expansive copyright protections pose significant threats to privacy, as well as 
freedom of expression, and they are willing to engage in lobbying in order to prevent that 
threat. It is difficult, then, to say that between copyright and other human rights, there is no 
conflict. 
